

WARRIOR OR PUNDIT: ETHICAL STRUGGLE OF ARMY SENIOR LEADERS

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ABSTRACT

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The U.S. Constitution mandates that to “provide for the common defense.” Congress shall have the power “to raise and support Armies.” It also states in Article II, section 2 that, “The President shall be Commander in Chief...he may require the opinion, in writing, of the principal Officer in each...Department...relating to the Duties.” As professionals, U.S. Army senior leaders not only have a constitutional requirement to both Congress and the President but an obligation to the force to engage in dialogue with these branches. This often creates an ethical dilemma for leaders, inherently designed to keep the process adversarial to prevent dominance by the army, executive, or legislative branches. The conflict does not end with these two elements. Army senior leaders are stewards of resources; the profession demands winning our nation’s wars. These circumstances collide as a decade of war has persisted. Therefore, the U.S., Military must have an ethical comprehensive strategy to address the probable issues of conflict termination and future warfare. This paper will examine the relationship between Congress, the executive branch, and the profession of arms as it conflicts with the future warfare scenarios and the military’s Constitutional and professional obligation: to fight and win our nation’s wars.

WARRIOR OR PUNDIT: ETHICAL STRUGGLE OF ARMY SENIOR LEADERS

The professional soldier should never pull his punches, should never let himself for one moment be dissuaded from stating the honest estimates his own military experience and judgment tell him will be needed to do the job required of him. No factor of political motivation could excuse, no reason of “party” or political expediency could explain such an action.¹

—General Matthew Ridgway
Nineteenth Army Chief of Staff

The United States Constitution mandates that to “provide for the common defense,” Congress shall have the power “to raise and support armies,” it also states that “The President shall be Commander in Chief.”² Professional Army senior leaders not only have a constitutional requirement to both Congress and the President but an obligation to the force to engage in candid dialogue with these elements of government for the betterment of the force. This often-delicate relationship between these equal branches of government puts Army senior leaders in an ethical quagmire as they navigate the strategic environment. Upon commissioning as a member of the Armed Forces, every officer takes an oath of office, a legally binding pledge that traces its origins to Article VI of United States Constitution.³ Although the officer oath has morphed five times in our history, the current version was made law in 1967 and states:

I, A.B., do solemnly swear or affirm that I will support and defend the Constitution of the United States against all enemies, foreign and domestic; that I will bear true faith and allegiance to the same; that I take this obligation freely, without any mental reservation or purpose of evasion; and that I will well and faithfully discharge the duties of the office on which I am about to enter. So help me God.⁴

Why is this important, and what does the oath have to do with being a warrior or a professional officer? Simplistically it has everything to do with being a professional officer. It is the very grain and ideal that guides our daily actions. A well-known Army

historian, Edward Coffman stated, “there is and always has been in the American Army officer corps an implicit – one could almost say instinctive – acceptance of civil power’s superiority to the military in government.”⁵ The effects of ten years of war, the perceived gradual and ongoing politicization of the military, and the decline in the professionalism and ethical decision making process requires a closer examination of current civil-military relations.⁶ Today’s economic, political, and global circumstances mandate a discourse—but that discussion must maintain the spirit of the oath, uphold the obligation to the American people, and most importantly be fair and just to our soldiers—the men and women who have pledged their lives for the ideal of democracy and to support and defend the United States Constitution.

From nearly a decade of warfare in Iraq and Afghanistan, the stressors of combat and the demands on the force are wearing on soldiers’ and leaders’ professionalism.⁷ The current and future operational environment will continue to place demands on both traditional and nontraditional military tasks.⁸ The strategic landscape remains uncertain, American society is changing, and the economic near-term picture remains bleak.⁹ This predicament will try the ability of leaders to articulate the needs of the force to meet the national security objectives and will be tested by our elected officials and, most of all, the American people themselves. Change is inevitable; America’s respect for the military remains at a high level, but diminished 6 percent from 2009 to 2010 Gallup polls.¹⁰ Anecdotally, the 2010 results might be due in part to outrage about the actions of visible and popular senior leaders.¹¹ However, with the changes in the current conditions, leaders will face a daunting task of justifying expenditures and the use of

forces in the name of national security in times of uncertainty and scant resources. As a result, the military's relationship to society will likely be strained.

While the political environment is complex, what is apparent is that military leaders will be thrust into a more pronounced role within the political sphere.¹² As such, this paper will examine the civil-military theory and strategic future operational environment to give context to the complexity of the situation. It will also review the history that corresponds to recent activities of Army senior leaders. Lastly, with a firmer grasp of the theory, environment, and historical ramifications of previous leaders, it will offer a recommendation for preparing leaders for the uncertainty of the future landscape of the policymaking process.

Theory

The relationship between civil society and the military in broad terms is the interaction between elements of society and the armed forces as an institution embedded within that society.¹³ A third element within the societal framework is an institution called government. Mackubin Owens summarized, "civil-military relations are concerned with the interactions among the people of a state, the institutions of that state, and the military of the state."¹⁴ Common characteristics of civil-military theory are control and relationships. The United States is structured on the rule of law defined in the U.S. Constitution, yet the hierarchy of control fluctuates constantly among the institutions of government, armed forces, and society. Thus, civil-military relationships are in a perpetual state of change and adaptation. The true test of a theory is time: Are the theory and its application durable and applicable regardless of the variable of time? To understand modern civil-military relations, as it is occurring today after ten years of

war we will examine several theories associated with civil-military relations as posited by Carl von Clausewitz, Samuel Huntington, Morris Janowitz, and Charles Moskos.

The great Prussian strategic theorist Carl von Clausewitz (1780-1831), popular with military professionals and extremely influential in the development and application of military doctrine, explained war as a trinity of people, government, and armed forces.¹⁵ These three elements are in a constant state of flux, and will either attract or repulse each other in war.¹⁶ Clausewitz applied his trinity theory to civil-military relations as well. He posited that citizens and civilian leaders should be cautious in asking soldiers for purely military advice.¹⁷ Clausewitz concluded that soldiers must be subordinate to politicians but not mere instruments of armed aggression. He contended that soldiers must have an active and responsible role to educate policy leaders and ensure that they understand the full extent of policy and military implications of their decision making process. Clausewitz's theory on civil-military relations from the early 1800s is still applicable today; the logic of his theory is consistent with modern civil-military theorists such as Samuel Huntington.¹⁸

Two of the most popular—perhaps even iconic—civil-military theorists, Samuel Huntington and Morris Janowitz, were both adverse to partisanship by members of the military.¹⁹ In fact Huntington in his 1957 book, *The Soldier and the State*, stated, “the participation of military officers in politics undermines their professionalism, curtailing their professional competence, dividing the profession against itself, and substituting extraneous values for professional values.”²⁰ In contrast to Huntington's political assessment, Janowitz's position, from a sociological perspective, is nonetheless focused on professional traits of honor: He advocated that military leaders remain above

politics in domestic affairs. He foresaw that potential changes in foreign policy regarding the Cold War could cause some military leaders to see themselves at opposing viewpoints with civilian policy elites: that this aspect of military leaders being “above politics” might change.²¹ While both theorists agreed on principal that military leaders must remain nonpartisan, Janowitz clearly saw that change was possible, whereas Huntington, believed civilian control would overshadow and mute such possibilities.

Huntington’s approach to civilian control of the military was to define the relationship between power, professionalism, and ideology. In essence, societies could be categorized by the interaction between three elements: (1) pro- or anti-military attitudes, (2) low or high civilian control (political), and (3) low or high professionalism of the military. These types of civil-military relations are as Huntington stated “ideals and extremes” and in practice a society is likely to have two of these types in combination in actual existence at one time.²² This theory is known as *objective civilian control*.²³

Janowitz’s theoretical model places political military relationships into four categories: aristocratic, democratic, totalitarian, and garrison state.²⁴ The democratic model is applicable to U.S. civil-military relations. As stated previously, Huntington’s and Janowitz’s theories have much in common. Starkly different is the way in which Janowitz viewed the military professional in relation to society and government institutions. Janowitz professed that military professionals are in the employ of the state and are broadly committed to democratic and national ideals. Therefore the professional ethic of the military in conjunction with strong parliamentary and legal oversight guarantees civilian political superiority.²⁵ Since military involvement in domestic politics is limited, the role of the military professional is mainly in the conduct of foreign affairs

and defense policy.²⁶ This role is most difficult during periods of sustained conflict.²⁷

Janowitz's theory allows for flexibility in application of Clausewitz's trinity, meaning that each element (people, government, and military) exercises power; the relative influence is indicative of society and social process of rules. Janowitz's and Huntington's theories share the idea of the professional ethic of the military. The central core of conduct by the military is its own perception of professionalism and its own ability to self-regulate actions in the framework of societal norms.

In an approach different from Huntington's and Janowitz's pioneering models, in 1970 civil-military theorist Charles Moskos and his colleagues considered an occupational vantage instead of the traditional institutionalized principals of social organization. The endstate of Moskos and his team's work was that the military profession has succumbed to civilian "organized authority" and has morphed away from the "social trustee" model rendering self-sacrificial service to the country. This metaphoric change from a "social trustee" to more of an "expert" reinforces the types of military relations posited by Huntington in the 1950s, and Janowitz's model of a smaller professional army.²⁸

However apt these civil-military theories may be, their proponents never foresaw a decade-long war with continuous casualties and such a profound impact on economy of the United States, yet such little impact on the society as a whole.²⁹ Concerns over the economy, unemployment, energy, and health care are likely to dominate the domestic political landscape for the near term.³⁰ The implications of today's operational environment and the difficult asymmetric or hybrid future will have an impact on civil-military relationships that was not foreseen in the past.³¹

Landscape

The challenge in understanding the dynamics of civil-military relations is not just limited to theory and the current wars but is an appreciation of current environment and the future strategic setting that will be likely be present for the remainder of the twenty-first century as policymakers and Army senior leaders navigate the formation of national security policy and objectives. A decade of war has the military, government, and nation focused on the near-term conflicts of Afghanistan and Iraq. As we proceed to conflict termination in Iraq in 2011, the nation and the military will focus on achieving victory in Afghanistan. Matthew Moten, a well-known West Point historian, eloquently stated, “The Army tends to reform at the end of wars that have accentuated its shortcoming of one kind or another.”³² When professionals do boldly attempt to make projections about future warfare, they are too often focused on total war concepts of nuclear war or cyberspace attacks. Military professionals often dismiss these extreme scenarios as too far beyond the scope of their individual influence. An examination of the future landscape is required to put into context the dynamics between policy elites and military professionals.

The guiding document for the military to shape, train, and organize the force is the National Security Strategy (NSS).³³ To appreciate the scope of moral conflict (civil-military relationships) we must achieve a holistic perspective and make assumptions about the environment of the future. Carl von Clausewitz said it best:

But in war more than in any other subject we must begin by looking at the nature of the whole; for here more than elsewhere the part and whole must always be thought of together.³⁴

In true military fashion, professionals spend an unbelievable amount of time studying the extreme nuances of past conflicts under the prescript that failing to understand the

past will only lead to the same mistakes in the future. This point is undeniably important.

Colin Gray professed, however,

obviously, the further away from today one peers and tries to predict, the foggier the course of future events becomes. Crystal balls that work reliably are hard to find, while astrology, alas is apt to disappoint also. But, ignorant though they are, defense planners are obliged to make guesses about the future.³⁵

Therefore military leaders must make an educated analysis about the future landscape incorporating current policy to adequately address the national security issues.

A mere nine months into the twenty-first century the world landscape changed dramatically. Some pundits suggest that 9/11 was a wakeup call to the effects of success of the Cold War. What is certain is that American policy and freedoms changed. Frank Jones captured the change by stating, “Unfortunately... it took this tragedy to catalyze the governments and the private sector in the United States to undertake such a massive concerted effort to prevent such an attack from recurring.”³⁶

In short order the domestic landscaped changed: The National Guard activated to protect airports; Congress passed the Patriot Act; the government formed the Department of Homeland Security; and military focus shifted from a conventional Cold War strategy to a more agile force capable of rapid deployments and counterinsurgency operations.³⁷

The international landscape is in a constant state of change. The world continues to be networked, by information, transportation, and economic interdependence. The 2010 Joint Operating Environment (JOE 2010) discusses in great detail the environment in which joint forces foresee the future.³⁸ In summation JOE 2010 assesses that continued rapid radical change in technology, unforeseen strategic actions by state- and non-state actors, and accelerated economic change will ultimately lead to uncertainty

and conflict.³⁹ Nearly half of industrial output is produced by multinational enterprises whose decisions on manufacturing, warehouses, and distribution centers have a powerful effect on domestic economics and politics.⁴⁰

Globalization of world economies has resulted in a shift from the powerful dominating nation-states to a world of interdependence where geography is relevant, but less important than the sovereign state's economic vitality. Will international and domestic landscape dominate and the armed forces be de-emphasized?⁴¹ Pundits such as Owens, Cohen, and others argue that America's continued engagement in world affairs will result in the use of military leaders as an economy of force to facilitate U.S. Government policy.⁴² The 2010 NSS has altered the United States' international strategy from a Cold War state-to-state geopolitical focus to more of a mosaic neoliberal perspective of whole of government engagement of the entire globe. U.S. strategy will proceed through an economic prescript where emerging markets, environmentally friendly practices, and innovation are predominant factors for alliances and global relationships. Thomas Friedman stated, "Professionally, the recognition that the world was flat was unnerving because I realized this flattening had been taking place while I was sleeping, and I had missed it."⁴³ The world is flattening and so will warfare in the twenty-first century.

James Petras and Henry Veltmeyer described globalization as "the widening and deepening of the international flows of trade, capital, technology and information within a single integrated global market."⁴⁴ Is globalization just an economic, informational, and environmental model that possesses no need for real application to our national strategy? The answer is no. Regional conflicts will grow as nation-states compete for

resources and people.⁴⁵ These attributes will cause tension among regional nation state competitors and will be targets of non-state actors focused on either ideological aims or personal economic gain. A slowdown in the population growth of the “west” puts it in direct competition with globalizing nation-states for information and economic dominance. The American polity will use all elements of national power to engage and mitigate these effects. In fact the NSS focuses on the aspects of globalization that relate to our economy and intertwines them throughout the strategic Diplomatic, Information, Military, and Economic (DIME) framework in a whole of government approach.⁴⁶ Hence, as the impact of the military instrument is lessened in foreign affairs and other elements of national power are given equal or more importance, all elements in the DIME framework combined equally to support national security.

The civil-military point of conflict will be how the United States balances DIME powers with regard to foreign policy. How will this change in policy affect the military? The concepts of war and the spectrum of conflict are likely to change. The twentieth century “total war” concept is shifting to a twenty-first century “limited war” construct with an increase of non-state actors attacking the sovereignty of today’s nation-states. Experts such as David Rapoport contend that for at least the next twenty years, we will be fighting non-state actors and terrorism.⁴⁷ Uncertainty regarding the impact of globalization upon governance and the challenges brought by non-state actors requires continual analysis by the civil-military community.

As Russia and the United States continue to cooperate on nuclear arms reduction, the likelihood of a nuclear nation-state using these weapons continues to diminish, but not disappear. War is an instrument of policy; the political aims of the last

60 years indicate the desire of maintaining a capability of total war as a form of coercive diplomacy or defense rather than first strike. The use of conventional forces will still dominate the twenty-first century. The global market, cyberspace (Internet and information), and relationships between nation-states and non-state actors create an interdependence that drives the political aims of nation-states and the use of military forces.

Understanding the landscape, the complexity, and the actors both domestically and abroad is critical to fully appreciate the dilemma Army senior leaders will face. Sun Tzu held, “if you know the enemy and know yourself, you need not fear the result of a hundred battles. If you know yourself but not the enemy, for every victory gained you will also suffer a defeat. If you know neither the enemy nor yourself, you will succumb in every battle.”⁴⁸ Therefore leaders must understand the enemy, in this case the challenges presented by the world landscape.

War in the future has one predictable constant: conflict will occur, brought on by human beings driven by political motive to achieve their desired state, regardless of how irrational it might be to the rest of the world. Globalization demonstrates the complex environment in which Army senior leaders will be forced into the policy realm. Mackubin Owens stated, “the character of the future security environment and future conflict will have a great deal of impact on the character of American civil-military relations.”⁴⁹ Understanding how civil-military theory applies to this environment is critical to achieving and maintaining a professional army that is in balance with the policy elite and supportive of the NSS.

Historical

To understand how theory and landscape affect civil-military relations, one must review the historical relationship of the military with the polity. The tradition of military honor might lead one to believe that recent actions by military retirees speaking out on DADT, 2008 presidential elections, security policy, and openness in political affiliation are relatively new occurrences. Important current considerations are that we have been at war with daily casualties longer than any other period of time, the U.S. Army is somewhat removed from society, and our elected officials lack the military knowledge of service like no other period in our time.⁵⁰

To grasp the magnitude of these factors, the author will discuss segmented periods of history to demonstrate the differences. From the Revolutionary War to the Civil War, U.S. history has a plethora of examples of officers pursuing political aspirations following military service, including two famous cases (Generals Scott and McClellan) while still in military service. As Jason Dempsey articulated, during this period of history, the norm was for combatants—especially leaders—to come from the “most politically relevant strata of society.”⁵¹ Phillip Melinger, in a recently published article in *Parameters*, detailed more than fourteen famous military leaders who pursued political office. Melinger explained that a military career was often seen as a stepping stone to political office, illustrating that 26 percent of Union generals and 36 percent of Confederate generals pursued and or held public office post military service.⁵² Huntington observed that political elites during this period of history did not distinguish members of the military as a professional class. Society was more fearful of military power in the hands of political officers than of political power in the hands of the

military.⁵³ Also characteristic of this timeframe was how commonplace it was for officers to show their political allegiance.

A list of U.S. Army officers in 1801 compiled by the War Department showed all 256 officers' political affiliations.⁵⁴ During this period of history, it was not uncommon for military officers to have a political affiliation of some sorts. Huntington attributed this to the populist movement, which encouraged officers to be active in politics.⁵⁵ However, what was beginning to prevail was a change in attitudes of West Point cadets and graduates. The change was in a shift from the populist thought processes to military officers that of should distance themselves from the political process.⁵⁶

Dempsey attributes this shift in attitudes to two key occurrences: (1) the public aversion to General McClellan's presidential aspiration in 1864 when he ran against Abraham Lincoln; and (2) a speech given by General Schofield to the graduating class of 1892, in which he urged all cadets to keep current with political happenings, but "wisely abstain from active participation in party politics."⁵⁷ This event and the prevalence of only retired officers participating in partisan politics was the turning point for military officer's involvement in the political process. Of note, during the reconstruction period, the military journal, *Army and Navy Chronicle*, published numerous articles on officer involvement in politics; a common emphasis was for officers to be "aloof from all politicians."⁵⁸ Speeches and articles by active generals also contributed to this new attitude—a shift to professional soldiers who were non-partisan in their affairs on and off duty.⁵⁹ Historians of the time labeled the post Civil War era as "The Army's Dark Ages," a period when Congress, the American People, and Business pacifism had isolated, rejected, and reduced the armed services.⁶⁰ This separation of

soldier from politician sparked a cultural change in the officer corps that essentially remained intact until the end of World War II.

Absent from the discussion of history thus far has been the role of the legislative branch. Huntington affirms that prior to World War II Congress was not fully attentive to the military or its constitutional obligation under Article II for manning and supporting armies.⁶¹ Congressional interest was on local politics associated with issues such as basing, naval yards, construction, and military procurement. It was not focused on the pure aspects as the framers had intended, Congress was more attuned to its political constituency, instead of homeland defense.⁶²

Two great leaders, General Douglas MacArthur and General George C. Marshall represent two broad perspectives of civil-military relations in terms of senior military officers participating in the policy process. Both were successful in improving the resource posture of the Army during their tenure; one through open engagement with the Congress and confrontation with the President and the other through quiet advocacy with the President, his staff and Congress. If you were to compare them to bookends, one would be a far left bookend and the other a far right bookend with a wide assortment of books between them.

The World War II era brought upon it a marked change in civil-military relations, especially with the way in which service chiefs interacted with Congress. It was common practice for administrative and military leaders not to offer opinions on the Presidential budget once it was submitted to Congress for legislative debate. General MacArthur was the first military officer to openly testify against the President's submitted budget. He was likely the most colorful, controversial, lauded, and vilified military man in

history.⁶³ General MacArthur, in his capacity as Chief of Staff for the U.S. Army, faced economic conditions similar to those present today. The economic depression led society to feel that drastic cuts were necessary in the army. Faced with tough economic decisions, Franklin Roosevelt had to decide upon how he would budget for and command the Armed Forces. Roosevelt planned to submit to Congress a reduction of 50 percent in the army budget.⁶⁴ MacArthur was less than pleased and in a “dramatic and painful encounter with Roosevelt in 1933, MacArthur presented his case...the Chief of Staff not only lost the argument, he lost his temper.”⁶⁵ In a contentious meeting with threats of blood on the President’s hands for his miscalculations, MacArthur was instructed by the POTUS to take his argument to the Bureau of Budget.

General MacArthur took the direction of the President Roosevelt and proceeded for the next two years as Chief of Staff to limit the proposed cuts in the army. His actions were successful, but still ultimately resulted in a 20 percent reduction in army budget appropriations.⁶⁶ Finding this result unacceptable, General MacArthur found a way to circumvent the President, although this was forbidden by the Budget and Accounting Act of 1921, to request more funds from Congress than authorized by the President. In a strategic move, he testified in 1935 to Senate Subcommittee on Appropriations stating, “Congress alone has the Constitutional authority to raise and support armies.” MacArthur pointed out the apparent illegality of the President’s budget office determining the size of the U.S. Army. In summation, he claimed that Congress had abdicated its sworn duty under the basic law of the land.”⁶⁷

Despite this contradictory viewpoint of the Presidential budget, Congress agreed with General MacArthur’s arguments and proceeded for the next three years to fund the

U.S. Army above the President's request. MacArthur remained the Chief of Staff of the Army until his first retirement in 1937. Ultimately, he was recalled to active duty, and was subsequently relieved for disobeying a Presidential order during the Korean Conflict. In his post relief Congressional testimony, he berated and questioned President Truman's foreign policy. The Congressional Record summarized his testimony, "General MacArthur challenged the President personally and Mr. Truman's foreign policy as expressed in the limitation on military action in the Far East."⁶⁸ It is one matter to testify and criticize the Presidential budget as a military expert following constitutional mandate and an entire different matter to publically criticize the President's foreign policy and disobey the Commander in Chief's orders. MacArthur's actions demonstrate acceptable and unacceptable behavior of senior leaders.

The other notable leader, the opposite bookend to MacArthur, was General George C. Marshall. In keen contrast to MacArthur, General Marshall's reputation throughout his seven years as Vice Chief of Staff and Chief of Staff of the Army was as a person who could build relationships with civilian leaders, Congress, and the military in which he led. General Marshall said, "I thought it far more important in the long run that I be well established as a member of the team and try to do my convincing within that team, rather than to take action publically contrary to the desires of the President and certain members of Congress."⁶⁹ Marshall was an active player with Congress for obtaining funds and support for the military. Richard Kohn noted, "with Presidents Roosevelt and Truman and Congress, Marshall was often brutally frank, sometimes even confrontational, but always cooperative and never dismissive...but it was always

done in private.”⁷⁰ General Marshall’s was the consummate Huntington professional, respected by all civilian leaders, Presidents and Congressmen alike.

Did General Marshall’s passion for democracy and civilian control overshadow his responsibilities for organizing and training the army? General Marshall exercised restraint as he publically kept silent in his dissent on Roosevelt’s domestic policies that might have had significant impacts on the war effort. General Marshall sat back quietly in 1941 as President Roosevelt mislead the American people on the aggressive U.S. posture toward Germany in the Atlantic and with regard to American forces’ support of England.⁷¹ Russell Weigley stated that the number of required army divisions for WWII was 215, yet General Marshall was limited to an army force of only 89 divisions.⁷² These actions, taken on the surface, indicate General Marshall’s extreme zeal for adherence to civilian control.

These dated examples show the precarious situations military leaders face in their roles as Army senior leaders, but two recent examples show similar dilemmas. General Eric Shinseki faced a similar circumstance as he undertook transformation of the U.S. Army and during midstream change was faced with providing forces to the Geographical Combatant Commander to support Operation Iraqi Freedom. During a Senate Armed Service Committee hearing on FY 2004 budget, Senator Levin asked General Shinseki about the magnitude of army forces need for an occupation of Iraq following completion of the war. An excerpt of the testimony reads:

Sen Levin: Could you give us some idea....of the Army’s force requirement for an occupation of Iraq...?

Gen Shinseki: In specific numbers, I would have to rely on the combatant commanders’ exact requirements. But I think with —
[Sen Levin interjected] How about a range?

Gen Shinseki: I would say that what's been mobilized to this point—something on the order of several hundred thousand soldiers are probably, you know, a figure that would be required....⁷³

This testimony resulted in a backlash of comments from Secretary of Defense Rumsfeld because of the large numbers and what was perceived by the Secretary as the General stepping outside of his service perspective lane. The author conducted informal dialogue with Senator Levin and his staff a few years after this testimony regarding this hearing. It was apparent from the dialogue that this line of questioning should be viewed through two separate lenses. The first lens was strictly from a congressional oversight perspective on force structure and an honest assessment of the needs based on General Shinseki's experience. The second lens was strictly from a political position that the executive branch had not fully planned for post-conflict operations; the opposing Democratic party wanted to put pressure on the executive branch for a reassessment. Senator Levin's staff confided that they had processed several letters of concern about operations in two theaters of operation.⁷⁴ Matthew Moten captures this well, "controversy surrounding Shinseki's 2003 Senate testimony, illustrates, the Constitution divides civilian control of the military between the executive and legislative branches, creating a constant tension among the military and its two civilian masters."⁷⁵

The second recent example involves a warrior in combat. The full analysis is not complete, but Dr. Marybeth Ulrich is preparing a Case Study on General Stanley McChrystal's relief as COMISAF that will undoubtedly shed a perspective on the implications and lessons associated with civil-military relations.⁷⁶ Although this case does not resonate with the previous Army Chief of Staff's examples of civil-military relations and their charter of organizing, equipping, and training the force for combat

operations on land, it is of value in analysis of policy process.⁷⁷ What can be ascertained from this situation is that General McChrystal had several missteps prior to his relief that could and likely did impede the policy process of the Commander in Chief, President Barack Obama. A 2007 Rand study concluded that public policymaking is a political process involving conflict and bargaining. The political process is defined as differences in goals and values, leading to different policy alternatives and options with various groups' participation in the policymaking.⁷⁸ The assumption of this Rand study and definition is the grounding principal of Huntington's civilian control theory, in that the very democratic nature of the U.S. political system, civilians retain supremacy in decision making over the military and U.S. national defense establishment.⁷⁹ Given this structure, when General McChrystal's remarks to the International Institute for Strategic Studies (IISS) in London October 1, 2009 were dismissive of Vice President Biden's Counterterrorism approach to the Afghanistan conflict he trumped a policy discussion that was in the conflict and bargaining stage.⁸⁰ This action was in direct conflict with the policymaking process and the President's lead agent for executive branch oversight of Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF). Derogatory and condescending remarks made later by McChrystal and his personal staff about President Obama's National Security Council was a blatant breach of professionalism and a strategic communication error that ultimately distracted from the policymaking process. This example shows another senior leader who ventured outside the ethical lane of conduct and placed himself in conflict with normal civil-military relationships. General McChrystal offered his resignation to President Obama, which was accepted without prejudice and he retired gracefully and honorably by thanking all actors and apologizing for his actions.⁸¹

Captured in the historical context was the undeniable fact that throughout our history the U.S. Army has had a political dynamic that has been at time contentious and in conflict with Huntington's view of civilian control. Other more recent examples could have been discussed but in the interest of brevity, the author chooses to keep the focus on former U.S. Army Chiefs of Staff, with the bold exception of a warrior in contact who was relieved for similar policy situations.

Discussion

Why is the relationship of the policymaker and military professional important today? TRADOC Pam 525-3-1, *The Army Operating Concept: 2016–2028*, describes how the U.S. Army will conduct operations as part of a joint force. General Dempsey stated that “As one of the critical elements in our national defense, the Army must continually adapt to changing conditions and evolving threats to our security.”⁸² He described a complex environment, with rapid changes and threats from wide range of actors that will emanate from diverse populations where enemies use all available advantages. General Dempsey further articulated that the U.S. Army will fight across a full spectrum of operations including either supporting or leading civil agencies both at home and abroad.⁸³ He closed the pamphlet with the following statement, “In addition, all Army leaders must exemplify moral and ethical conduct and demonstrate their commitment to the professional military ethic, the Warrior Ethos, and Army values.”⁸⁴

Is there really a problem with civil-military relations? Upfront, the essence of separation of power and military subordination to civilian control is not in jeopardy. The professional attributes of the armed forces, a body that operates within its own domain and that self-regulates, remains. The events of the past, specifically the actions by General MacArthur and his ultimate relief by President Truman has entrenched in the

officer corps a deep belief in the subordination of military to civilian control. With undeniable refutability the military has made the aspect of objective civilian control the norm and part of the service culture.⁸⁵ Clausewitz and modern theorists such as Huntington, Janowitz, Moskos, and others believe that partisanship by members of the military is not a good idea.⁸⁶ Evident in all theory is that a constant struggle exists and that in the course of normal operations that each element in the trinity (people, government, and military) would exert influence differently given the events of the day.⁸⁷ Complicating this fact is the Founding Fathers' deliberate separation of power as it relates to the control of the military by both the Commander in Chief and Congress. This natural tension is further enhanced by the profession in the form of its own judgment and moral beliefs, which may or may not be representative of society itself.⁸⁸ Army senior leaders and all senior members of the armed forces will inevitably find themselves in situations where experience and pure military recommendations will not be sufficient to give Congress and the President full assessments of military options in the complex global world today. Therefore a common understanding of policymaking, the role of the military professional, and the complexities of the current and future landscape is important and worthy of continued dialogue.

So why are the civil-military theories and history worthy of discourse and review if subordination of the military to civilian authorities is not in jeopardy? On the surface no significant crisis or emergency is readily apparent. The historical examples of Generals MacArthur and McClellan's actions to subvert and promote individual agendas and narratives in the promotion of opinions for the direction of policy are not commonplace today. The modern civil-military relationship is much deeper and nuanced; it affects not

only the military profession but transcends the legislative and executive policymakers and the public. For example, as mentioned previously, policymakers are more involved with the armed forces' internal domain, not since the Goldwater-Nichols Act of 1986 have these elements sought or thought it necessary to manage and influence the culture or personal domain of the armed forces. The American people are also losing faith in the military profession, as indicated by a July 2010 Gallup poll and because of today's domestic situation. When leaders fail to appreciate the complexity of the domestic and global situation missteps will occur, as with General McChrystal and his comments on policy the of counter-insurgency and counterterrorism in Afghanistan. Sometimes even when military leaders understand the situation and offer their personal opinion based on years of experience it's perceived as political maneuver as in the case of General Shinseki. Theory, history, and the landscape are integral parts of the whole and must be understood at strategic level in order to foster balanced and meaningful civil-military relations. Janowitz summarized it best when he posited that refined military leaders recognize that "in seeking to influence the fortunes of their services, in advising on strategic national defense policies, and in spending of the bulk of the federal budget, a nonpartisan stance is essential."⁸⁹ Just as General Marshall did in the past, current leaders must understand the waters they navigate to achieve their objectives. Failure to understand and appreciate the environment will inevitability lead to error in navigation; the result could lead to them directly into a severe storm with grave and dire consequences.

As the United States remains at war in Iraq and Afghanistan to protect the homeland and preserve our way of life, changes will occur in both the domestic and

global landscape that will stress civil-military relations. These events in themselves should not allow Army senior leaders to neglect the need for long-term structural and cultural advancements. This concern is also apparent to our Army senior leaders: General Casey charged General Dempsey to review the profession in 2010 and if necessary reemphasize and recommit the military profession to ensure our leadership development, training, and strategy meet the demands of twenty-first century landscape.⁹⁰ Given the future landscape, effects of war, and inevitable drawdown of the military, it's imperative that we educate ourselves to avoid the mistakes of the past and be positioned to meet the national security requirements of the future.

Recommendations

Army senior leaders have obligations to soldiers as well as both the legislative and executive branches of government. Although history provides a perspective of these obligations, it demonstrates a fact that no one scripted methodology can address the complex, uncertain, ambiguous, and sometimes adversarial dealings with the legislative and executive branches. This lack of definition and methodology puts leaders in a situation of learning by experience—good and bad. Therefore, a conceptual framework is needed for preparing leaders for the arduous task of professional interaction with our civilian policy forming leaders. In the 2010 Army Posture Statement, General Casey articulated, “we must ensure that our Nation has the capability and range of military options to meet the evolving changes we face in the 21st century...versatility is the central organizing principal of a balanced Army.”⁹¹ The author recommends that Army senior leaders consider the adoption of Army Center of Excellence for Professional Military Ethic (ACPME) postulated Professional Military Ethic (PME) framework, create a formalized civil-military education program, and direct

Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC) to perform an analysis for implementation of ethic and civil-military affairs into leader development and education programs (LDD).⁹²

A profession's purpose is to serve society by providing a necessary and useful specialized service. The profession of arms therefore demands development of a distinct specialized knowledge and imparts expertise through formal, theoretical, and practical education.⁹³ Furthermore, Field Manual 1 articulates that professions create their own standards of performance and codes of ethics to maintain effectiveness with society. The Army Chief of Staff has proclaimed that we must be versatile and capable of meeting the requirements of the future. Don M. Snider's monograph, *The Army's Professional Military Ethic in an Era of Persistent Conflict*, calls for a dialogue on development of a professional ethic. A dialogue is overdue; after almost ten years of nearly continuous conflict, the current force is in both ethical and educational atrophy. To meet the needs of the force, to grow as a subset of society, and to maintain our own effectiveness as a global force an expansion of Professional Military Ethic (PME), is warranted. Multiple professionals and pundits, such as General Casey, General Dempsey, Dr. Snider, Dr. Mary Ulrich, Suanne C. Nielsen, Richard Kohn, Sam Sarkesian, Peter Feaver, John Dempsey, and other notables conclusively agree that the force must embrace education in civil-military affairs and ethics.

The Army Center of Excellence for Professional Military Ethic (APCPME) published Dr. Snider's ethical framework for study of the Army system of ethics.⁹⁴ In the monograph, Snider and his coauthors use an organizational culture model by Edgar Schein and show how the framework is incorporated into the army culture. The

evidence and information presented is exceptional, yet Army senior leaders may lack clarity on how to implement the framework. Schein posited a successful model for incorporation into army culture. Schein's model of cultural change includes six elements; five of the elements are ongoing already in the U.S. Army.⁹⁵ The only element not actively ongoing and most likely the key to complete the influence on the army culture and ethic is education. Schein stated that it, "is to be taught to new members as the correct way to perceive, think or feel in relation to those problems."⁹⁶ Education is the key factor in ethics and civil-military affairs.

TRADOC should assume lead agency for implementation of Professional Military Ethic (PME) and civil-military affairs. The U.S. Army's quest to achieve jointness and to meet compliance requirements of Goldwater Nicolas Act has left a void in formalization of doctrine into a training program. FM 1 states "to a greater degree than ever, diplomatic, information and economic factors affect national security" yet no formal training program exists to reinforce or to make this a part of our culture. FM 3-0 states that the political variable includes the U.S. domestic political environment, but no formal educational program exists to reinforce or educate the profession on civil-military relations. TRADOC Pam 525-3-1 expresses that "Army senior leaders must be able to communicate...with political leaders, and among allies...moreover, they must be able to apply their skills within the framework of a larger war-winning strategy."^{97 98} Given these three critical army doctrine manuals, TRADOC is the logical force integrator for ethics and civil-military affairs education to embed our espoused values in our organizational culture—the Army Profession of Arms.

Conclusion

The global landscape of the future environment with all of its complexity marked by unprecedented change in network information, transportation, and economic interdependence threatens U.S. national security. The uncertainty of the global landscape, the undefined threats, and the likely debate and impeding disagreements between the legislative and executive branches over budget matters and force levels will have impact on senior army leaders, as they will be thrust into ethical dilemmas as they serve multiple masters. With the change in the current and future conditions, leaders will face a daunting task of justifying expenditures and the use of forces in the name of national security and limited resources. The fact is that military and civilian political elites need each other in order to make policies and fulfill their constitutional responsibilities.

This paper analyzed the effects of ten years of war, the gradual and continued politicization of the military, and the decline in professionalism and ethical decision making processes in the historical review of civil-military relations. Warfare in Iraq and Afghanistan, the stressors of combat, and the demands on the force are wearing on Soldiers' professionalism. The current and future operational environment will continue to place demands on both traditional and nontraditional military tasks. As such, this paper examined the future strategic environment and reviewed the applicable civil-military theory and historical context of civil-military relations to four army leaders. From this foundation of the environment, theory, and historical ramifications of previous leaders, the paper proposed recommendations for preparing leaders for the uncertainty of the future landscape of the policymaking process.

Change is inevitable; the three recommendations proposed to meet the complex situation facing the army profession are: (1) accept the operations framework proposed by Dr. Don Snider for Professional Military Ethic (PME); (2) commit to educating the force about ethics and civil-military relations; and (3) affix responsibility to Training and Doctrine Command for study and implementation. While the political environment and dilemma involve many considerations, what is apparent is that military leaders will be thrust into a more pronounced role within the policy sphere.

Endnotes

¹ General Matthew B. Ridgway, USA, (Ret.) As told to Harold H. Martin, *Soldier: The Memoirs of Matthew B. Ridgway* (New York: Harper & Brothers, 1956), 271, quoted in Sam C. Sarkesian and Robert E. Connor, Jr., *The US Military Profession into the Twenty-First Century: War, Peace and Politics* (London: Routledge, 2006), 179.

² U.S. Constitution, art. 2, sec 2.

³ Senate concurrent Resolution 108, edition 22, pocket version of the United States Constitution, July 18, 2006.

⁴ Lt Col Kenneth Keskel, USAF, "The Oath of Office: A Historical Guide to Moral Leadership" *Air & Space Power Journal* 16, no. 4 (Winter 2002), 49.

⁵ United States Military History Institute, *The Constitution and The United States Army* (Carlisle Barracks: U.S. Army War College, 1988), 26.

⁶ Suzanne C. Nielsen and Don M. Snider, eds., *American Civil-Military Relations: The Soldier and the State in a New Era* (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 2009), 43.

⁷ U.S. Department of the Army, *2011 Army Posture Statement*, (Washington, DC: U.S. Department of the Army, March 1, 2011), 1.

⁸ U.S. Joint Forces Command, *White Paper – The Joint Operational Environment – Into the Future* (Norfolk, VA: U.S. Joint Force Command, January 11, 2005), 5; Bradd C. Hayes and Jeffrey I. Sands, *Doing Windows – Non Traditional Military Responses to Complex Emergencies* (Newport, Rhode Island: Center for Naval War Studies, 1997), 72.

⁹ Jeffrey M. Jones "U.S., Satisfaction Dips to 17% at Year's End Economy, jobs continue to rate as most important problems," linked from Gallup Poll webpage, Politics, <http://www.gallup.com/poll/145295/Satisfaction-Dips-Year-End.aspx> (accessed December 12, 2010).

¹⁰ Lydia Saad, "Congress Ranks Last in Confidence in Institutions: Fifty percent 'very little'/'no' confidence in Congress reading is record high," July 22, 2010, linked from Gallup Poll, linked from Gallup Poll webpage, Politics, <http://www.gallup.com/poll/141512/congress-ranks-last-confidence-institutions.aspx> (accessed October 30, 2010).

¹¹ Gallup's 2010 data gathering took place during the same month that *Rolling Stone* published an article about the actions of General Stanley McChrystal and his staff and their opinions of senior elected and appointed officials. The article received wide media attention. Michael Hastings, "The Runaway General" <http://www.rollingstone.com/politics/news/the-runaway-general-20100622> (accessed March 9, 2011).

¹² Jason K. Dempsey, *Our Army – Soldiers, Politics, and American Civil-Military Relations* (Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 2010), 177.

¹³ Trevor N. Dupuy et al., *International Military and Defense Encyclopedia* (Washington, DC: Brassey's [US], 1993), 507.

¹⁴ Mackubin T. Owens, *US Civil-Military Relations after 9/11: Renegotiating the Civil-Military Bargain* (New York: Continuum International Publishing Group, 2011), 12.

¹⁵ Carl von Clausewitz, *On War*, trans. Michael Howard and Peter Paret (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1976), 89.

¹⁶ Christopher Bassford, "Teaching the Clausewitzian Trinity," January 3, 2003, linked from Clausewitz homepage at "readings" <http://www.clausewitz.com/readings/Bassford/Trinity/TrinityTeachingNote.htm> (accessed February 26, 2011).

¹⁷ Clausewitz, *On War*, 607. Clausewitz stated: Only if statesmen look to certain military moves and actions to produce effects that are foreign to their nature do political decisions influence operations for the worse. In the same way as a man who has not fully mastered a foreign language sometimes fails to express himself correctly, so statesmen often issue orders that defeat the purpose they are meant to serve. Time and again that has happened, which demonstrates that a certain grasp of military affairs is vital for those in charge of general policy.

¹⁸ Owens, *US Civil-Military Relations after 9/11*, 20.

¹⁹ Dempsey, *Our Army*, 27.

²⁰ Samuel P. Huntington, *The Soldier and the State: The Theory and Politics of Civil-Military Relations* (Cambridge, Massachusetts: Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 1957), 71.

²¹ Dempsey, *Our Army*, 28.

²² Huntington, *The Soldier and the State*, 96.

²³ For background and full understanding of the complicated concepts regarding the objective civilian control theory postulated by Huntington, see Samuel P. Huntington, *The Soldier and the State*, 80-97. Below is a summary of these types and their aspects as they relate to Objective Civilian Control theory:

Type 1 – Antimilitary ideology, high military political power, and low military professionalism. Characteristic of primitive countries or where retardation in professionalism or high security threat. Examples include Latin American (1950s), Germany (WWI) and USA during WWII. **Type 2** – Antimilitary ideology, low military political power, and low military professionalism. Characteristic of society ideology overpowers all other elements. Example is Germany during WWII. **Type 3** – Antimilitary ideology, low military political power, and high military professionalism. Characteristic of a society that suffers from few threats to security. Example USA after the Civil War to the beginning of WWII. **Type 4** – Pro-military ideology, high military political power, and high military professionalism. Characteristic of threats on their security and sympathetic to military values. Example is Prussia and Germany during the Bismarckian-Moltkean epoch (1860-1890). **Type 5** – Promilitary ideology, low military political power, and high military professionalism. Characteristic of society that is relatively safe from threats and dominated by society sympathetic to military viewpoint. Example is civil-military relations in the twentieth century Britain.

²⁴ Morris Janowitz, *The Military in the Political Development of New Nations* (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1964), 111.

²⁵ Ibid., 112.

²⁶ Ibid., 2.

²⁷ Ibid., 4.

²⁸ Don M. Snider and Lloyd J. Matthews, dir. and ed., *The Future of the Army Profession*, 2nd ed. (Boston: McGraw Hill, 2005), 48.

²⁹ *The Joint Chiefs of Staff Home Page*, <http://www.jcs.mil/speech.aspx?id=1517> (accessed January 12, 2011). Excerpt on background of service and relationship with society: So what has happened to us? Where are we? And the metric that I used – and I thought Cohen – Richard Cohen – wrote a great column about the whole issue. If you haven't read it, you ought to read it. Because I had validated that column. And fundamentally, what Cohen was saying is, America doesn't know its military. And the United States military doesn't know America. And I have been out and around the country. And statistically, it gets into this less than 1 percent, one more focused, kind of, from various – they know from certain parts of the country, extraordinary – American people are extraordinarily supportive of our men and women. This was an antenna that was way up for me on, you know – in March of 2003 because of my background – because they weren't Vietnam.

³⁰ Owens, *US Civil-Military Relations after 9/11*, 172.

³¹ Ibid., 189.

³² Matthew Moten, "The Army Officers' Professional Ethic—Past, Present and Future," February 2010, linked from *Strategic Studies Institute* webpage "Military Professionalism Studies," <http://www.strategicstudiesinstitute.army.mil/pubs/display.cfm?pubID=966> (accessed October 27, 2010).

³³ From the NSS, a series of nested other documents proliferate the military spectrum, those include the National Defense Strategy (NDS), the National Military Strategy, the

Quadrennial Defense Review Report (QDR), Guidance on the Employment of the Force (GEF), and other joint and service centric manuals such as the Training and Doctrine Command (TRADDOC) pamphlet 525-3-2. The above list is not a comprehensive list of sources.

³⁴ Clausewitz, *On War*, 75, quoted in Colin S. Gray, "War – Continuity in Change, and Change in Continuity" *Parameters*, no. 2 (Summer 2010): 5.

³⁵ Gray, "War," 6.

³⁶ U.S. Army War College Guide to National Security Issues, *Volume II: National Security Policy and Strategy* (Carlisle: Strategic Studies Institute, 2010), 131.

³⁷ *Ibid.*, 132-33.

³⁸ For more background information see the entire United States Joint Forces Command, *The Joint Operating Environment (JOE)* 2010. This is an excerpt from the JOE 2007 available at http://www.au.af.mil/au/awc/awcgate/jfcom/joe_dec2007.pdf; page 7. This is a very concise statement on structure of JOE. The Joint Operating Environment document provides a framework for the study and articulation of a range of alternative future operating environments. The JOE presents future joint operating environments that have been developed after a wide-ranging examination of global, environmental, sociological, technological, and military dynamics that will influence the course of future conflict. The JOE document is intended to provide a research-based grounding for further discussions about the implications of potential future operational environmental trends for the joint training, experimentation, doctrinal development, and operational communities. These alternative futures can then be used to support the development of joint and service concepts, scenarios, experiments, exercises, and long term operational plans. By examining a number of critical trends influencing potential future operational environments and associated threats, this paper will serve as a common frame of reference and guide for civilian and military leaders responsible for the capabilities-based joint transformation process.

³⁹ United States Joint Forces Command, *The Joint Operating Environment (JOE)* (Suffolk: Joint Futures Group [J59], 2010), 60.

⁴⁰ Joseph S. Nye and David A. Welch, *Understanding Global Conflict and Cooperation* (White Plains, NY: Pearson Longman, 2007), 239.

⁴¹ *Ibid.*, 173.

⁴² *Ibid.*, 175.

⁴³ Thomas L. Friedman, *The World Is Flat: A Brief History of the Twenty-First Century* (New York: Farrar, Straus and Giroux, 2005), 8.

⁴⁴ James Petras and Henry Veltmeyer, *Globalization Unmasked: Imperialism in the 21st Century* (Halifax, Fernwood Publishing, 2001), 11.

⁴⁵ Admiral Gary Roughead, "U.S. Navy Update," lecture and briefing handout from verbatim remarks delivered November 16, 2010 to the Hudson Institute, U.S. Army War College, Carlisle Barracks, PA, December 7, 2010.

⁴⁶ For background on the whole of government approach and concepts see Barack Obama, *A National Security Strategy* (Washington, DC: The White House, May 2010). An illustration of this fact is a challenge identified in the NSS, how to advance American interest in a world that has changed—a world in which the international architecture of the 20th century is buckling under the weights of new threats, the global economy has accelerated the competition facing our people and businesses, and the universal aspiration for freedom and dignity contends with new obstacles.

⁴⁷ USAWC, *Theory of War and Strategy*, Vol. II, AY 2011, pg 247.

⁴⁸ Sun Tzu, *The Art of War*. Translated by Samuel B. Griffith (London, Oxford University Press, 1963), 84.

⁴⁹ Owens, *US Civil-Military Relations after 9/11*, 175.

⁵⁰ *The Joint Chiefs of Staff Home Page*, <http://www.jcs.mil/speech.aspx?id=1517> (accessed January 12, 2011).

⁵¹ Dempsey, *Our Army*, 10.

⁵² Phillip S. Meilinger, "Soldiers and Politics: Exposing Some Myths," *Parameters*, no. 2 (Summer 2010): 76.

⁵³ Huntington, *The Soldier and the State*, 168.

⁵⁴ Dempsey, *Our Army*, 11.

⁵⁵ Huntington, *The Soldier and the State*, 207.

⁵⁶ Edward Coffman, *Old Army*, 8-10, quoted in Dempsey, *Our Army*, 11.

⁵⁷ Dempsey, *Our Army*, 14.

⁵⁸ *Ibid.*, 13.

⁵⁹ *Ibid.*, 14.

⁶⁰ Huntington, *The Soldier and the State*, 229.

⁶¹ *Ibid.*, 401.

⁶² *Ibid.*, 400.

⁶³ Colonel Rod Paschall, *The Constitution and the United States Army* (Carlisle Barracks: U.S. Army War College, 1988), 100.

⁶⁴ *Ibid.*, 100.

⁶⁵ *Ibid.*

⁶⁶ Paschall, *The Constitution and the United States Army* 101.

⁶⁷ Ibid.

⁶⁸ Arthur Krock, "MacArthur's Testimony a Series of Challenges," *Congressional Record* (April 26 to May 24, 1951): S5045.

⁶⁹ George C. Marshall, *George C. Marshall Interviews and Reminiscences* (Lexington, VA, 1991), 297 quoted in Nielsen and Snider, *American Civil-Military Relations*, 288.

⁷⁰ Richard H. Kohn, *Building Trust, Civil-Military Behaviors for Effective National Security*, quoted in Nielsen and Snider, *American Civil-Military Relations*, 288.

⁷¹ Ibid., 289.

⁷² Russell Weigley, "The Principals of Civilian Control," *The Journal of Military History* (October 1993): 51.

⁷³ U.S. Congress, Senate, Senate Armed Service Committee, Hearing on the Fiscal Year 2004 Defense Budget, 2nd Session, February 25, 2003, accessed online Dec 9, 2010, http://web.lexis-nexis.com/congcompl/document?_m=10561e6754ad4c55afb28a68fa9fcfs6

⁷⁴ Background. During a congressional oversight trip to Europe for missile defense, the topic of conversation arose several times with Senators and members of their staff in an informal setting and all part of normal small talk conversations. This dialogue was not recorded and recollection of events and discourse is from the author's memory of the December 2008 trip. The essence of this information is to demonstrate that Congress's role of oversight and their Constitutional obligations "to provide for common defense...to raise and support Armies" has secondary political consequences that might not be the initial or ultimate objective of the oversight questions. Fact finding and decisions about force size require considerable discourse with members of Congress, the executive branch, Department of Defense, and Office of Management and Budget. When one element is non or lacking in specificity, these types of situation arise in public forum. SASC Professional Staff Members generally perceived Secretary Rumsfeld as delaying or not fully responding to Congressional questions regarding force structure.

⁷⁵ Matthew Moten, *A Broken Dialogue Rumsfeld, Shinseki, and Civil-Military Tension*, quoted in Nielsen and Snider, *American Civil-Military Relations*, 45.

⁷⁶ Dr. Marybeth P. Ulrich, "Civil-Military Relations: Professional Foundation for Senior Leaders: US Army War College Noon time Lecture Series, 28 October 2010. Background: I viewed the noon time lecture via USAWC youtube recording, contacted Dr. Ulrich and asked for a hardcopy of the slides, her case study. She provided all material, but did not authorize release of her material as it was a coordinating draft pending publication.

⁷⁷ U.S. Department of the Army, *The Army*, Field Manual 1 (Washington, DC: U.S. Department of the Army, June 14, 2005), 2-6.

⁷⁸ Thomas S. Szayna et al., *The Civil-Military Gap in the United States, Does It Exist, Why, and Does It Matter?* (Santa Monica, CA: Rand Corporation, 2007), 20.

⁷⁹ Ibid., 15.

⁸⁰ Charles D. Allen, "Lesson Not Learned: Civil-Military Disconnect in Afghanistan," *Armed Forces Journal* (September 2010): 32.

⁸¹ General Stanley McChrystal, "Retirement Remarks," Fort McNair, Washington, DC, 23 July 2010, cited by permission of Dr. Ulrich. Background: General McChrystal's remarks are riddled with jokes and one-liners to his audience. About 1/3 of the speech as provided is of serious nature and reflective of sincerity.

⁸² U.S. Department of the Army, *The United States Army Operating Concept*, TRADOC Pam 525-3-1 (Fort Monroe, VA: Training and Doctrine Command, 19 August 2010), iii.

⁸³ *Ibid.*, 37.

⁸⁴ *Ibid.*

⁸⁵ Owens, *US Civil-Military Relations after 9/11*, 68; United States Military History Institute, *The Constitution and The United States Army*, 26.

⁸⁶ Dempsey, *Our Army*, 27.

⁸⁷ Owens, *US Civil-Military Relations after 9/11*, 36.

⁸⁸ *Ibid.*, 70.

⁸⁹ *Ibid.*, 28.

⁹⁰ U.S. Department of the Army, *Army: Profession of Arms 2011 the Profession after 10 years of persistent Conflict*, Booklet (Washington, DC: U.S. Department of the Army Center for the Army Profession and Ethic (CAPE), October, 2010), i.

⁹¹ John M. McHugh and George W. Casey, Jr., *America's Army: The Strength of the Nation: A Statement on the Posture of the United States Army, Fiscal Year 2010*, Posture Statement presented to the 111th Cong., 2nd sess. (Washington, DC: U.S. Department of the Army, 2010), 12.

⁹² To avoid confusion between professional military education (PME) and professional military ethic (PME), the word ethic will replace the acronym PME when it refers to ethics.

⁹³ U.S. Department of the Army, *The Army*, Field Manual 1 (Washington, DC: U.S. Department of the Army, June 14, 2005), 1-10-11.

⁹⁴ Don M. Snider, Paul Oh, and Kevin Toner, "The Army's Professional Military Ethic in an Era of Persistent Conflict," Strategic Studies Institute – ACPME Vol 1 (October 2009): 11.

⁹⁵ *Ibid.*, 6. For further background on organizational culture, see Edgar H. Schein, "Organizational Culture," *American Psychologist*, Vol. 45, No. 2, February 1990, pp. 109-119. Definition offered by Edgar Schein for any organizational culture: We must first specify that a given set of people has had enough stability and common history to have allowed a culture to form. This means that some organizations will have no overarching culture because they have no common history or have frequent turnover of members. Other organizations can be

presumed to have strong cultures because of a long shared history or because they have shared important intense experiences (as in a combat unit). But the content and strength of a culture have to be empirically determined. They cannot be presumed from observing surface cultural phenomena. Culture is what a group learns over a period of time as that group solves its problems of survival in an external environment and its problems of internal integration. Such learning is simultaneously a behavioral, cognitive, and an emotional process. . . . Culture can now be defined as (a) a pattern of basic assumptions, (b) invented, discovered, or developed by a given group, (c) as it learns to cope with its problems of external adaptation and internal integration, (d) that has worked well enough to be considered valid, and therefore, (e) is to be taught to new members as the (f) correct way to perceive, think, or feel in relation to these problems.

⁹⁶ Ibid.

⁹⁷ U.S. Department of the Army, *The Army*, Field Manual 1 (Washington, DC: U.S. Department of the Army, June 14, 2005), 2-2.

⁹⁸ U.S. Department of the Army, *The United State Army Operating Concept, Training and Doctrine Command Pamphlet 525-3-1* (Washington, DC: U.S. Department of the Army, August 19, 2010), 35.